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LEGISLATIVE REFORMS OF GOVERNMENTAL
TORT LIABILITY: OVERREACTING TO MINIMAL
EVIDENCE
Ann Judith Gellis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Calls for tort reform to stem the growing tide of tort suits and costs
come not only from private sector defendants, but from the public sector as
well. The rapid and significant increases in insurance premium rates for
local governmental entities which occurred from 1983 to 1985 heightened
an already strong chorus of complaints by local government officials that
local governments were being deluged with lawsuits to the detriment of the
public interest.' In large measure, these complaints are part of a broader
feeling that society is being overtaken by "hyperlexis" and that the tort
system has veered too far from its traditional course of a fault-based system
of compensation and deterrence to a no-fault system with an overall
emphasis on risk spreading. Local governments have lent their support to
changes in tort rules, such as elimination of joint and several liability and
limitations on noneconomic damages.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. The
author expresses her appreciation to Roger B. Dworkin, Merritt B. Fox, Bryant G. Garth,
and Lynne Henderson who read and commented on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See, e.g., Blum, Lawsuits Put Strain on City Budgets, NAT'L L.J., May 16, 1988, at
1, col. 1; Cities Drawing Legal Fire, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Costs and
Availability of Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 143-44 (1986) (testimony of Hon. Grant
Jones, National Conference of State Legislatures) [hereinafter House Hearings]; The
Ongoing Crisis of the Availability and Affordability of Liability Insurance and its Effects
on the Housing Industry, Local Government, and Transit Systems, 1986: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-99 (1986) (testimony of Stephen Chapple,
General Counsel United States Conference of Mayors) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
2. See, e.g., resolution of National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, adopted at its
1986 Mid-Year Seminar on "The Tort Liability Crisis: Insurance Unavailability Problems,
Self and Group Municipal Liability Insurance Risk Management", supporting "an in-
depth exploration of tort reform measures designed to reduce municipal exposure to
liability. Included in this evaluation should be recommendations for changes in joint and
several liability, collateral source rules, structured settlements, damage limitations laws,
statutes of limitations and attorney fee limitations; and other legislation to achieve solutions
to the problems [created by the tort liability and insurance crisis]." 27 MUNICIPAL
ATTORNEY No. 2, at 9 (Mar.-Apr. 1986).
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The public sector has also pushed, with considerable success, to
further expand the umbrella of tort immunity. This umbrella is unavaila-
ble to private sector defendants, and it distinguishes governmental tort
reform from general tort reform. However one analyzes tort law and tort
reform in general, there is a compelling need to determine whether this
institution of local and state governments should be reinvigorated at the
end of the twentieth century. The usual justification for local government
tort immunity is the overriding interest of society in having public services
provided, even if negligently.' Governments cannot go out of business;
certain services must be provided; yet, there is a limit on how much revenue
local governments can raise. Nevertheless, changes which make it more
difficult or impossible for victims of governmental negligence to recover
compensation, or which widen the kinds of entities entitled to tort
immunity, also affect the daily lives of citizens by influencing the quality
and quantity of public services provided by government, and the distribu-
tion of the costs of those public services. Costs unaccounted for in the
governmental decision making process are shifted to the individual victims.
Whatever the causes of the current "tort crisis," or indeed whether
such a crisis exists, we have already witnessed in tort law what Professor
Priest called "the most extraordinary state law development having
national impact since the states' unanimous adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code. '" 4 Much of this extraordinary change deals specifically
with the tort liability of our local governments. The liability of local
governments raises important issues, separate from the questions of tort
liability in general. It is therefore important to understand the changes in
local government liability, and how these changes affect the allocation,
distribution and costs of public services. Neither the understanding of the
tort crisis nor the proposed remedies are the same for local governments
and private parties.
Local governments were among the hardest hit by the liability
insurance crisis, and governmental tort law reforms are a response to the
hue and cry that governments raised about the tort liability explosion.
Until now there has been no analysis of trends in common law tort cases
against state and local governments. This article examines the recent
reforms in state tort immunity statutes and the evidence of trends in tort
cases against local governments. Legislators have embarked on a flurry of
3. James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 610, 614 (1955); see also Symposium on Civil Liability of Government Officials, 42
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 104 (1978) [hereinafter Liability Symposium].
4. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1523-24 (1987).
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activity. Have they defined the issues correctly? Are their acts based on
panic or on a sound understanding of what they perceive as a crisis
requiring an attack on tort doctrine?
Part II of this article examines the functions and consequences of the
doctrine of governmental tort immunity. It looks at how the doctrine
interacts with the allocation of resources for public goods and services and
the distribution of costs of those goods and services. Part III considers both
recent changes and proposals for changes in state tort immunity laws which
enlarge local governmental immunity. Parts IV and V address the issue of
what evidence is available to support this need for greater immunity from
tort liability. Part IV discusses the insurance crisis experienced by local
governments in the eighties. Part V explores empirical evidence on
governmental tort liability, and then reviews the questions remaining open
for future study.
There is, in fact, little evidence bearing directly on local governmental
tort liability. Thus, there are many open questions. An examination of the
kinds of recently adopted legislative reforms in tort immunity statutes
makes it apparent that many local governments, faced with significant
costs of repairing, replacing or expanding public infrastructure and
facilities to meet current needs, want the option not to do so. They want to
place the costs of their nonaction on the users of existing public facilities.
This allocation of costs reverses decades of legislative and common law
development. This article contends that neither sound reasoning nor
compelling empirical evidence supports such a dramatic reversal in the
treatment of public, as opposed to private, tort liability.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FUNCTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
The current flurry of legislative activity expanding governmental tort
immunity, discussed more specifically in Part III below, renews the debate
about the functions of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its
interaction with the functions of tort law. This Part discusses the
underpinnings of arguments in favor of expansion of immunity and
questions whether the doctrine results in efficient and equitable govern-
mental decision making. It concludes that, while some form of immunity
may be necessary to preserve legislative policy making processes from
judicial encroachment, the negative aspects of the doctrine - in particular
its exacerbation of government's tendency to account for costs inaccurately
and to distribute costs inequitably - require that there be no expansion
either of the types of activities covered or the types of organizations entitled
to protection in the absence of evidence that increased liability exists and
that increased costs pose a real threat to the delivery of public services.
1990]
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A. State of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
The application of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity to
local governments has always troubled the courts, with the result that the
pronounced rules often confounded logic and justice. Municipal corpora-
tions in particular have never been afforded the same immunity protection
as the state sovereign. In fact, quite the opposite rule prevailed until the
mid-nineteenth century: Municipal corporations were treated as private
corporations which could be sued for their torts.' As a theory of municipal
corporation law evolved which gave municipal corporations characteristics
of both a public entity, owing its creation and continued existence to the
state, and a private corporation, serving its shareholders/citizens, the rules
on tort liability were altered to reflect this dual nature." The entity was
immune for torts it committed in its governmental capacity, but it was not
immune for activities committed in its proprietary or private capacity.
As one would expect, there were difficulties in labeling activities as
distinctly governmental or proprietary, either at any one time, or over time
as perceptions of government's role in society changed. Added to the
inevitable inconsistencies in judicial opinions of whether an activity fell
into one category or another, were the inconsistencies resulting from the
different treatment given to other local governmental units, most notably
the county. Counties, as agents of the state government, enjoyed broader
immunity than did municipalities. Thus, it was not uncommon to have
within one jurisdiction situations where activities undertaken by a city
might give rise to liability, but a county undertaking the same activity
would be immune.7
The 1960s and 1970s saw a judicial assault on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as being absolute, ill-grounded in legal theory, and
inequitable.8 The steady erosion of immunity for state and local govern-
5. For a history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal
corporations, see E. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924); see
also Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in
Respect to the Common Law-Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 OR. L. REV.
250 (1937).
6. Barnett, supra note 5, at 262, 266-70. For a broader discussion of the development
of the public-private distinction in connection with the status of municipal corporations, see
H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 220-39 (1983); Frug, The City As a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1099-109 (1980).
7. Borchard, supra note 5, at 42-45 & 229-30.
8. Van Alystyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 919, 920-22; Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176-78 (1977). See also the general discussion of the Abandonment
of Government immunity in D. MANDELKER, D. NErsCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 435-37 (2d ed. 1983).
[Vol. 21:375
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
ment torts no doubt was a response to the more expansive role of
government in the lives of its citizens. As government engaged in more
activities previously conducted by private individuals, more citizens
suffered injury at the hands of government. At the same time, society's
views of the purposes of the tort system as a whole were changing. Notions
of compensation and risk spreading - of not leaving the victim without a
remedy - could not co-exist with a broad exemption for governmental
tortious acts in an ever growing activist state.9 After all, the government
with its taxing power over all members of the community is the ultimate
risk spreader.
With the fall from favor of the sovereign immunity doctrine went the
distinction between governmental and proprietary activities as a guiding
principle for determining local governmental liability. In its place, courts
and legislatures have employed a new test which examines whether the
activity which gave rise to the injury was discretionary or ministerial (or, in
some formulations, planning versus operational) in nature.1" Discretionary
activities generally are those involving some form of legislative or quasi-
legislative policy decision making. Ministerial activities are those which,
while they may require the government actor to exercise discretion and
judgment, are essentially activities of implementation. The focus of inquiry
has shifted from distinguishing types of activities to defining the essence of
government decisionmaking processes in order to protect policy determi-
nations of the legislature from judicial interference. For, while the courts
led the way in seeking to eliminate absolute sovereign immunity at the state
level and to bring a more principled application of the doctrine at the local
government level, there has always been general acceptance that a
limitation on judicial review of legislative decisions is inherent in the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches.
B. Nature of Dissatisfaction with Current Status of Local Governmen-
tal Immunity
Every damage recovery against a government has an effect on its
treasury, and thus, imposes restraints on a government's ability to allocate
9. See L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 52-76 (1985). Professor Friedman attributes the
shift in emphasis of twentieth century tort law from admonishing people who were
blameworthy to compensating victims to the changes in people's expectations of recovery.
Larger businesses and government and the availability of liability insurance meant that
fuller compensation could, and should, be obtained.
10. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 209, 218-25 (1963); D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, supra note 8, at 449-
1990]
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resources. Even so, there are few serious calls for a return to absolute
immunity. This suggests that there is some consensus that society's concept
of justice requires governments to pay their "fair share" for harm arising
out of the performance of ministerial (or operational) activities. Addition-
ally, there does not seem to be significant disaffection with the discretion-
ary/ministerial test for determining liability exposure. Rather, the thrust
of the arguments is that governments are paying more than their fair share.
The question of what constitutes governments fair share has two interre-
lated aspects.
1. Deep Pocket Phenomenon
The first is the belief that local governments are "deep pockets."" It is
argued that juries do not comprehend the link between damages awarded
against governments and the amount of taxes needed to pay those awards
and still maintain public services at the current level; therefore, juries view
cases involving government defendants as cost-free opportunities to engage
in wealth transfers from society to the individual. In addition, the doctrines
of joint and several liability and comparative negligence make it highly
desirable to join a government defendant whenever possible.12 Since it has
the power to tax, a government, unlike an individual defendant, is not likely
to be judgment proof.
Local governments claim that they have higher damage awards
assessed against them than individual defendants responsible for compara-
ble injuries, and that they are often joined in actions where their
involvement is, at best, tangential. There is some evidence to support the
claims of local governments that they have been victims of the deep pocket
phenomenon. A study of jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, in the
period 1959-1979, conducted by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, found
that for comparable injuries, governments (constituting 8 % of defend-
ants) had higher damage awards assessed against them than did individu-
11. Blum, surpa note I at 32; E. I. Koch, Statement before the Governor's Advisory
Commission on Liability Insurance 6, 8 (Feb. 21, 1986) (copy on file with author).
12. The doctrine of comparative negligence allows a plaintiff, even if negligent, to
recover damages over and above the amount attributed to his own negligence. Under the
doctrine of joint and several liability, those damages can be recovered from any negligent
defendant, regardless of the degree of fault. It is argued that together the doctrines
encourage plaintiffs to join a "deep pocket" defendant to ensure full recovery. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy
Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, 64 (Feb.
1986); State of New York Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance, 1 Insuring Our
Future 146-4 (Apr. 7, 1986) (appointed by Governor Mario M. Cuomo) [hereinafter
Cuomo Commission Report].
[Vol. 21:375
1990] GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
als." The study also showed that jury awards increased by 50% when a
corporate or governmental defendant was joined with an individual
defendant."' Contrary to the rhetoric, the deep pocket phenomenon did not
represent a changed perception of the role of awards by juries. It was
consistently found throughout the twenty year period. 15 Although the
study's finding suggests a pattern, it appears to be based on a small number
of cases against where government defendants, particularly were there are
severe injuries. 6
The Rand data does not, in any event, support claims that local
governments are easy targets for suit. There is no evidence that juries held
governments to a different standard of liability than individuals or
corporations.17 In fact, the little evidence there is on government liability
suggests that government defendants have a higher success rate than other
defendants. This is found both in the Rand study which showed that
government defendants won three out of five jury trials, 8 and in recently
completed studies of section 1983 civil rights litigation. The latter studies
found significant differences between the success rate of constitutional tort
plaintiffs (suits in which the defendant is a governmental entity or official)
and non civil rights litigants, even controlling for presence of counsel. 9
A number of other civil litigation studies show that, in general,
13. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
COUNTY JURY TRIALS 43 (1985) [hereinafter DEEP POCKET STUDY]. When plaintiffs'
injuries were moderate, government defendants paid 50% more than individual defend-
ants, while corporate defendants paid 30% more. For severe injuries, government
defendants paid nearly two and one-half times more than individual defendants, while
corporate defendants paid four times as much. Id.
14. Id. at 48.
15. Id. at 44.
16. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
17. DEEP POCKET STUDY, supra note 13, at 25-26.
18. Id.
19. In a series of constitutional tort litigation studies in the Central District of
California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia,
Professors Eisenberg and Schwab found that, even using a very broad definition of success,
constitutional tort plaintiffs did significantly worse than non civil rights litigants. Eisenberg
& Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.REv. 641,677
(1987). A case was defined as successful if"(1) the plaintiff wins after trial, (2) the parties
settle their dispute, (3) the court grants a stipulated dismissal, or (4) the plaintiff dismisses
the case voluntarily." Id. at 681. Constitutional tort plaintiffs in counseled, nonprisoner
cases, in the California study were successful about 50% of the time, compared with a
success rate of 80% for plaintiffs in contested noncivil rights cases. Id. at 682. Findings in
the other federal districts were similar: "[Nionprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs
succeeded. . . in 50% of the cases filed. Control group plaintiffs succeeded in 84% of the
cases they filed." Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government As Defendant, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 719, 729 (1988).
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plaintiffs have success rates in the range of 80 % to 90 % in non-civil rights
cases.20 Yet, data obtained from New York City shows that 55 % of tort
filings against the City are disposed of without monetary settlement.21 A
study conducted for the International City Management Association on
Public Officials Liability found that in civil lawsuits involving suits under
federal civil rights legislation and suits related to condemnation and land
use decisions, plaintiffs in over 50 % of the suits do not receive monetary
damages.22 City and state governments have also been found to be more
successful in appellate cases, both as appellant and as respondent, against
all kinds of litigants.23
20. See, e.g., A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH,
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964) (a study of automobile accident
cases in Michigan for 1958); Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961) (a
study of personal injury litigation in New York City for 1957); H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF
COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970) (a study of
automobile accident claims filed with an insurance company in March and April 1962); D.
TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FELSTINER, H. KRITZER & A. SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION
RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT, PART A (1983) (an extensive nationwide study of over
1600 civil cases) [hereinafter CLRP STUDY].
The Michigan study excluded government defendants. The study of personal injury
litigation in New York City clearly included government defendants since two sources of
data were the City's Law Department and the New York City Transit Authority. The study
did not, however, isolate statistics for government defendants. Without knowing the
number of government defendants represented in the sample, no conclusion can be drawn as
to whether plaintiffs were equally successful against government defendants. The authors
of the study do not note any significant differences. The CLRP Study did include
government defendants, but they made up a very small percentage, from 2% to 7% of
defendants in state court litigation Id. at 1-68.
21. Koch, supra note 11, at Exhibit I (data provided by the Corporation Counsel's
Office of the City of New York with respect to tort filings and settlements in the period 1977-
1985). See infra notes 156-74 and accompanying text.
22. Eighty-seven percent of reported claims involved settlements of under $20,000.
ICMA & The Wyatt Company, Public Officials Liability Insurance: Understanding the
Market 12 (1986).
23. In an empirical study of who wins and loses in state supreme court cases, using a
sample of cases over the period 1870-1970 from sixteen states, city and state governments
had the highest success rate as appellant, as respondent and combined. Cities and states had
a net advantage (comparing the appellant success rate with the opponents' appellant
success rate) of plus 11.8 %. Moreover, governments success rates in appeals increased over
time from 49% in the late nineteenth century to 67% in recent decades. Wheeler,
Cartwright, Kagan & Friedman, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing
In State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 403, 419-20, 424-26, 431
(1987).
Cities and state governments' overall advantage over individuals was 8.4%. Small
town governments were not as successful: individuals had an overall advantage of 2.2 % over
small towns. This was thc only finding where the "have not" party had the advantage. Id. at
420.
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There are a number of possible factors which might explain why
governments as defendants are more successful. Local governments, as
''repeat players," may devote relatively more resources to their cases than
the plaintiffs. 4 At the same time, they may be less sensitive than business
organizations, also repeat players, to the costs of litigation in determining
whether to settle or litigate claims.2 5 Schwab and Eisenberg make a related
point in their analysis of the success of governmental defendants in
constitutional tort cases. Because the incentive structure of governments is
far more complex, that is, not fueled primarily by profit maximization,
plaintiffs make inaccurate predictions of how governments will behave.
This leads them to miscalculate litigation costs. At the same time,
government defendants may be more accurate in their own predictions of
behavior and costs. 2 6
It may also be that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, even if not
applied in a particular case, has created a bias in favor of government. For
example, Ross' study of automobile accident claims, Settled Out of
Court,27 found that insurance companies routinely settled cases in which
liability did not exist either out of sympathy for the injured party or
because they feared a sympathic jury.2" It may be that, given a past
tradition of broad tort immunity for governments regardless of the
24. See generally Galanter, Why the "Haves'" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974). Galanter analyzes outcomes of
litigation in terms of the types of parties, e.g., one-shotters versus repeat players, and in
terms of the advantages enjoyed by repeat players. He notes, for example, that repeat
players can "play the odds," and are more likely to play for rules in litigation either by
litigating or appealing cases "they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules." See
also Wheeler, supra note 23, at 403-04. This study of state supreme court decisions assumes
governmental parties are repeat players with strong resources. Id. Their success rates, see
supra note 23, support Galanter's hypothesis that "haves" are more successful in the
appellate process as well. Schwab and Eisenberg also discuss the literature on how being a
repeat player affects the incentives to litigate to deter other similar suits. Schwab &
Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 751, 753-55.
25. See H. Ross, supra note 20, at 204-11, for a discussion of the practice of insurance
adjusters, despite public statements to the contrary, to pay claims for their nuisance value
even where the absence of liability is clear. Addressing the denial of such practice, Ross
says: "This is common rhetoric in the companies I studied, although its apparent
irrationality in the context of a profit enterprise may be a first clue to the state of reality.
Businesses are rarely run primarily on matters of principle." Id. at 204. Governments,
however, are not profit-making enterprises and officials tend to be goal or principle oriented.
This may mean that the nonfinancial gains from litigating (e.g., preservation of a
government's reputation for not settling cases in the absence of liability) are greater than
the costs associated with litigation. See also Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 750-55.
26. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 750.
27. H. Ross, supra note 20.
28. Id.
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seriousness of the injury, governments and juries, alike, are less vulnerable
to such sympathies.29 Juries may in fact understand the connection
between taxes and damage awards and, therefore, be less likely to find
against governments except in the clearest cases. This last explanation,
however, must be reconciled with the evidence of the jury's deep pocket
bias once it finds liability.30 What we know at this point is that it is tougher
to obtain a finding of liability against a government defendant. But once
liability is found, there may be a deep pocket bias.
2. Interference with Resource Allocation
The other aspect of determining government's fair share is more
complex. At its root, the argument asserts that governments are paying too
much relative to their other functions. In part, this argument is a
recognition that the continued provision of basic public services demands
that government not be sued into bankruptcy no matter how negligent its
acts and no matter how fair the system otherwise is in terms of treating
defendants equally. 1 It is also a recognition that there are both legal and
political limits on taxation by local governments. As a result, there may not
be revenues sufficient to finance the true cost of the public services desired,
including costs associated with accident avoidance and negligent perform-
ance. Intertwined with this last point is the fundamental issue underlying
sovereign immunity. Given political restraints on revenues and govern-
ment's need to continue functioning, who shall decide who will bear the cost
of government activities? Shall the legislature decide ex ante or the courts
ex post?
The effect of tort liability on government's pocketbook is twofold. It
not only diverts current funds from other public services, but also interferes
with future allocations. In order to avoid further liability, the government
diverts funds from other competing uses which government managers may
consider higher priorities. Tort immunity maximizes a government's
ability to allocate resources in furtherance of its political agenda by
preventing judicial second guessing of the costs and benefits of government
29. Cf Wheeler, supra note 23, at 440 (in appellate cases involving governments, the
authors point to the difference in success rate between large and small governments to
postulate that the greater success of governments is tied to "greater legal sophistication and
litigational capabilities" rather than any bias toward government).
30. See text accompanying supra notes 13-16.
3 l. See the general discussion of limits on sovereign liability in Liability Symposium,
supra note 3, at 104.
[Vol. 21:375
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decisions.32 Damage limitations also serve as a method, although necessa-
rily crude,3" of preventing governments from paying too much in the
aggregate; and thus act to limit judicial intrusion on the legislature's
overall ability to allocate resources.34
Unrestrained judicial review of government decisions poses other
concerns for the political well-being of the community in addition to
concern for the separation of powers between the branches of government.
At least one function of tort liability is to create -incentives to prevent
injuries by forcing the internalization of the costs of carelessness. Underly-
ing the continued acceptance of some immunity for government acts are
assumptions about government actors and organization which suggests
that these incentives do not get properly translated into government
decision-making processes. Fearing liability, bureaucrats who are already
risk averse may become more so, and the pool of talented persons willing to
forego private advantage to serve in the public sector may be reduced. The
psychic income of serving the public may not be sufficient to overcome fear
of lawsuits and possible liability. The result, it is argued, is over-deterrence:
a government decisionmaking process which is less capable of, and less
willing to, entertain imaginative ideas.35
Governments produce a wider package of goods and services than
32. See, e.g., Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Private, in Liability Sympo-
sium, supra note 3, at 45, 50.
33. Damage limitations or caps typically place ceilings on the total amount recover-
able by any one person and the aggregate amount paid out per occurrence. These amounts
are unrelated to actual damages, severity of injury or number of injured parties.
34. See infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text, for a review of recently enacted
legislative reforms which carve out more areas of immunity. These statutes suggest that,
with a few exceptions (e.g., hazardous waste and pollution liability), it is not so much
dissatisfaction with the standard of care imposed that concerns reformers (e.g., juries
applying no-fault standards instead of the traditional fault based standard of negligence)
but rather the amount paid.
35. A distinction must be made between official liability and government-enterprise
liability. The former raises a more direct and serious issue of over-deterrence. But, even with
official immunity, government liability may unduly restrain the governmental decision-
making process because of its negative effects on officials' behavior. See, e.g., Lipman v.
Brisbane Elementary School District, 55 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 359, P.2d 465,467, 11 Cal. Rptr.
97, 98 (1961) (en banc) (citing the possibility of inhibited officials and inability to attract
persons to government services as reasons for denying enterprise liability as well as official
liability). For analyses of the effects of official civil liability versus the effects of enterprise
liability on the behavior of government actors, see P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT
(1983); Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officials, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1153-74
(1981); Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers, Property Rights and Official
Accountability, in Liability Symposium, supra note 3, at 26-33; Shepsle, Official Errors
and Official Liability, in Liability Symposium, supra note 3, at 35; Baxter, Enterprise
Liability, Public and Private, in Liability Symposium, supra note 3, at 45.
1990]
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private sector suppliers, and the mix of goods and services they produce is
far more fluid. From one period to the next, the mix reflects both changes in
the public's desired level of funding for services previously supplied, and
demand for new services in response to the absence or inadequacy of
market suppliers. A government decision to provide a good which is either
unavailable in, or inadequately supplied by, the private sector involves
various sub-decisions relating to the provision of that good: how much to
produce, who should receive the good, how to finance it, and how to
structure delivery of the good. These decisions are complicated political
decisions, quite apart from the political nature of the budgetary process.
Moreover, the indivisibility of "public goods," (i.e., exclusion is not
feasible) 6 makes it more difficult to measure government's productivity or
effectiveness in managing resources.37 Thus, the argument in favor of
sovereign immunity is not only that judicial second guessing is inappropri-
ate in our democratic society in terms of who makes decisions as to resource
allocation, but that the complexity of the decision-making process as to the
entire output makes it far less certain that the judiciary has the information
necessary to second guess as to any one decision. 8
36. One commentator defines "public good" as follows:
(1) If the good is available to one member of a group, it is available to the others, or
at least cannot economically be denied them. (2) If provided to one member of a
group, the good can be provided to others at no extra cost, or at least at an extra cost
that is below the average cost of all the units provided.
Olson, Official Liability and Its Less Legalistic Alternatives, in Liability Symposium,
supra note 3, at 67, 72.
37. "The very indivisibility that makes a public good go to everyone in a group in
essence makes it unquantifiable. Thus, we usually don't know how much output an agency
has produced, or if we knew, whether that level of output would reflect efficient
management of the resources." Id. at 75.
38. Id. at 78. Olson points out that official immunity is based on assumptions about the
ability of government managers to monitor the performance of their subordinates, and
states that those assumptions are invalid because of significant informational difficulties.
This argues for eliminating or restricting official immunity in order to improve govern-
ment's performance. But, argues Olson, these very same informational difficulties that
plague government managers also apply to the courts. Thus, removal of official immunity
will not necessarily translate into more efficient government agencies. Olson's argument
applies with equal force to a rule imposing enterprise liability. We will not necessarily get
more efficient decision-making by imposing liability. It may be, however, that the separate
issue of fairness, in terms of compensation for the victim, might dictate allowing recovery
against the enterprise as a whole, whether or not the court can effectively determine expost
the efficiency of government decisionmaking processes.
See also Kramer & Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 249, 283-86. Kramer and Sykes note that, while both strict
and negligent vicarious liability result in better resource allocation in the private sector
because each forces cost internalization, the result of cost internalization by the public
sector was not clear. Reduction in government services may or may not be efficient. Cf
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There is some force to the arguments against judicial intervention in
decisions; it makes sense to have decisions in accord with the public's
interest as defined by the electorate. But, limiting recovery by either
immunizing the act or capping damages places upon a randomly selected
segment of society, those who are victims of government negligence, the
cost of government's pursuit of one goal over another. Our system of tort
law does not, of course, provide every victim of an accident with monetary
compensation. Accidents caused by government acts can be viewed as a
group of events for which society has decided compensation should not be
paid. 9
But there exists a question of basic fairness. Unlike accidents where
the law determines no one is at fault, injuries suffered at the hands of
government but for which no compensation is paid because of immunity
are acts which if performed by one's neighbor or the XYZ Corporation
would yield recovery. It is true that a victim's practical chance of recovery
against a private defendant depends upon the financial position of the
tortfeasor, but the government is different from a judgment proof defend-
ant. In the case of government negligence, the law denies recovery. To the
victim, this is morally different from a law under which he can obtain a
determination of a wrong committed, but may be unable to recover
damages because the defendant has no assets. There is the possibility the
plaintiff might eventually recover against the defendant if assets become
available. Moreover, in the government negligence case, there is an
ongoing relationship between the parties that is likely to exacerbate
feelings of injustice on the part of the victim. The typical tort suit against a
government defendant is one in which, on one side, we have a plaintiff who
has been paying taxes to the tortfeasor and on the other side a defendant
who, as in the past, can compel the payment of taxes from all citizens,
including the victim, to meet its various obligations. Thus, to use Professor
Cass, supra note 35, at 1179 (arguing that enterprise liability provides both better
incentives for government officials and compensation for the victim).
39. The movement of the tort system away from a fault based system to one designed
primarily to compensate victims has been the subject of great legal debate about why it
came about, its moral underpinnings, its effect on tort litigation and liability insurance and
the adequacy of a judicial system to administer a no-fault system of victim compensation.
However clear the direction of tort law may be, we have not yet endorsed a no-fault system
for parties injured by pure accidents. For general analyses and commentary on the direction
of modern tort law in general and the legal scholarship in the area. See L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL
JUSTICE 52-76 (1985); G. E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA (1985); Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
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Michelman's terminology from a related analysis of the just compensation
issue, tort immunity carries with it "demoralization costs." '
The inequity of noncompensation is in some instances compounded
because the victims may not, in fact, be random. For example, a number of
states single out maintenance of parks and recreational facilities for
immunity from tort liability on the ground that only government will
provide such services to the public free or at substantial subsidization. The
additional burden of liability would cause some governments to withdraw
such services to the detriment of the community. Sovereign immunity
allows governments to choose to maintain their parks negligently. If a
government chooses negligent maintenance, some citizens will stop using
the parks. Those who can afford to buy park services from other suppliers
(e.g. membership in a country club) will not use the public parks, but those
who cannot afford to purchase park-like services elsewhere are left behind.
One rejoinder to the argument that lower income persons bear the
brunt of a practice of negligent park maintenance is that such persons are
also the prime beneficiaries. Even negligently maintained parks are better
than no parks, and tort liability for negligent maintenance of parks would
result in communities ceasing to provide them at least through general
revenues (as opposed to user fees)."1 Assuming this is the case, there are
still other social costs which flow from tort immunity to be considered in
terms of the quality of the governmental decision-making processes. The
issue i*s not simply whether or not dangerous parks are better than no parks
at all. Of the two groups, those who can purchase park-like services and
those who cannot, those who can afford to exit are the more likely, had they
no exit option, to voice complaint.4 They have more resources and more
political clout. With court remedies eliminated,the costs of the decision as
to the level of maintenance are not only borne randomly by the victims, but
the victims are more likely to be from a group with less financial ability to
bear those costs and less political ability to object or call into question
allocation decisions through other political processes.43 Immunity for
40. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). Michelman
notes that the issues addressed in his article are closely akin to the issues of compensation
from the treasury for accident victims generally. Id. at 1214 n.5. Where the losses are
attributable to direct government decisions, as they are in the "regulatory takings"
discussed by Michelman, the issue is, "shall the losses be left with the individuals on whom
they happen first to fall, or shall they be socialized?" Id. at 1169.
41. See the discussion in the text accompanying infra notes 52 & 53 for why this
assumption may not be correct.
42. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE AND LOYALTY 45-53 (1970).
43. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 38, at 279 (uncompensated injuries from section
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operation of hospitals and correctional facilities is subject to the same
objection. The victims come from groups with limited political access and
limited options, or no option at all, except to use the public services.
However imperfect the translation of deterrence incentives from court
decisions might be, the absence of liability reduces significantly the
chances that government decisionmakers will account for these costs in
making their choices ex ante. The result is a less efficient decisionmaking
process and one which is less responsive to consumer preferences." If the
only "voice" has been silenced, government will not pay sufficient attention
to preferences for safety in recreational facilities. If dissatisfaction is
muted or ineffectively presented, unsafe parks may not be the product of a
reasoned consideration of whether such parks are better than no parks, but
rather the product of political expediencies.
There are other factors which suggest government officials will not
consider the true costs of negligent delivery of public services. Politicians
are under constant pressure to provide increased public goods and services.
In part, they are responding to the demands of voters, and in part they are
motivated by their own desire to be reelected. Visible, tangible delivery of
public services enhances their stature for the next election. Similarly, most
theories of bureaucratic behavior posit that government agencies operate
to expand their budgets. 5 Yet, at the same time, government actions are
restrained by demands, sometimes reaching fever pitch, for lower taxes.
There is significant empirical data that citizen pressures for both
increased services and lower taxes exist side by side. Surveys of California
and Massachusetts voters after enactments of constitutional property tax
limitations in those states found that in voting for severe restrictions on
property taxes, voters neither wanted, nor saw the necessity for, any cut in
public services .4 Noting that these two sets of demands often coexist,
1983 violations may "fall" disproportionately on segments of the population with limited
political power; as a result, a majority of the electorate, even if informed as to the behavior of
municipal officials, "may prefer liability externalization"). See also Michelman, supra
note 40, at 1255 (to the extent uncompensated losses fall on the poor, the poor are less likely
to feel that in the course of their participation in society, they have achieved reciprocity in
compensatory concessions. Non-compensation will be experienced as more unfair and
unjust).
44. A. Hirschman, supra note 42 at 59-61.
45. For literature on the motivations and behavior of politicians and bureaucrats, see
generally A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); D. KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1978); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
46. D. SEARS & J. CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA,
44-50 (1985); Ladd & Wilson, Why Voters Support Tax Limitations: Evidence from
Massachusetts' Proposition 2-!1, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 121, 124 (1982).
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Professors Kramer and Sykes, addressing municipal liability under section
1983, suggest that municipalities will view "externalization of liability" as
an opportunity for cost reduction. 7
Maintenance is a low visibility service, and empirical evidence
supports the theory that when a bureau is forced to reduce costs,
maintenance will be at the top of its list.4 8 Maintenance is an operating
expense funded out of the current budget for which the short term political
rewards are likely to be viewed as less compelling compared with those
associated with adding new facilities or new programs. 9 Unless the cost of
nonmaintenance has an impact on the availability of funds for visible
programs or activities more highly valued by politically active interest
groups, lowering maintenance standards is the least painful way to reduce
costs. The less painful political decision may translate into undue hardship
for the ordinary users of public facilities.
It is of course true that in practical terms there is a limit on how high
taxes can be raised at any given time. Governments must choose what
services to provide and at what level. It may well be that, after decades of
neglect, costs of upgrading and maintaining public infrastructure at a level
sufficient to avoid liability, when combined with the costs of providing
other services at the same level as before, are beyond the taxing capacity of
many governments.6 0 This political fact may explain the large number of
47. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 38, at 279. See also A. MELTSNER, THE POLITICS OF
CITY REVENUE 196 n.5 (for references to literature concerning the lack of nexus between
preferences for expenditures and desire to pay taxes), 203 (1971).
48. See, e.g., F. LEVY, A. MELTSNER & A. WILDAVSKY, URBAN OUTCOMES 48, 59,
137 & 185 (1974) (the authors found that in the three public services they studied in the
City of Oakland - schools, streets and libraries-- maintenance expenditures were the
most expendable); see also H. LEONARD, CHECKS UNBALANCED: THE QUIET SIDE OF
PUBLIC SPENDING 169-75 (1986) (an analysis of the current problems with the nation's
infrastructure which lays much of the blame for our decaying infrastructure on the forces
which make maintenance politically unrewarding).
The connection between maintenance and liability costs can be seen in a study of
lawsuits against municipalities and schools arising out of injuries in parks and recreational
facilities. This study found that most accidents are the result of lack of supervision and poor
maintenance. In particular, cases against municipalities involved more instances of poor
maintenance. Supervision, like maintenance, is an operating expense. B. VAN DER SMISSEN,
THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF CITIES AND SCHOOLS FOR INJURIES IN RECREATION AND PARKS §
4.2 at 192 (1968).
49. See H. LEONARD, supra note 48, at 173, where the author discusses the
disincentives created by treating maintenance as an operating expense, and therefore, not
"bondable."
50. Public works spending at all levels of government dropped from 20% of public
expenditures in 1950 to 7 % in 1984. Estimates of replacement or rehabilitation costs for the
nation's bridges alone is put at $51.4 billion. Clinton, America is Buckling and Leaking,
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1988, at A3 1. A recent study commissioned by the Municipal Bond
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states which have extended tort immunity to the upkeep of public
infrastructure." One can argue, then, that crude measures such as
immunity are politically necessary, even if they are not justified by sound
policy.
Even accepting the power of the argument purely for expediency, it is
still not clear that governments should use immunity to respond to the
problem of insufficient funds. The immunity remains even when the
political necessity for the immunity has ceased; as state law, it is applied to
all local governments regardless of individual financial capacity. Most
important, providing for tort immunity presupposes that certain choices
are inevitable - suppositions which may or may not be accurate.
Return to the example of tort immunity for park maintenance and the
argument that even though lower income persons bear the brunt of a
practice of negligent maintenance of parks they are the prime benefi-
ciaries. There is an underlying assumption that, under a rule of liability, no
community would choose to allocate sufficient funds for adequate park
maintenance given the other public services which must be funded. This
seems an unlikely assumption, for it means that public parks have no value
to those persons with higher incomes who can afford to purchase park-like
services. On the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that the distribution
of park services is biased in favor of the well-to-do, i.e., they get better and
more services than the poor.52 While this bias presents other problems for
the equitable distribution of public services, it nevertheless suggests that
parks are valuable to all members of the community53 and that the
distribution of park and recreational services is probably unrelated to the
immunity/liability rules. Thus, one has to question decisions that create
incentives to maintain recreational facilities poorly, driving away the well-
to-do and putting significant risks on those who cannot elect to purchase
alternatives.
Insurance Association estimates that, by 1995, state and local governments will spend
about $150 billion annually on capital improvements and infrastructure. Twenty percent of
these expenditures will be supported by public borrowing. Bond Buyer, N.Y. Times, June 5,
1989, at A16.
51. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
52. Inman & Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1662, 1675 (1979); F. LEVY, A. MELTSNER & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 48, at 232-
37.
53. A. MELTSNER, supra note 47, at 204 (reporting that culture, recreation and public
safety were the public services most often mentioned by citizen leaders as the services they
used).
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III. REFORM OF STATE IMMUNITY STATUTES
The persuasiveness of the policy arguments is best assessed after
examining the situation. First, it is clear that change is taking place in areas
that the foregoing discussion suggests raises serious problems. Whether
one wants to support such changes will depend to a great extent then on the
matters discussed in the subsequent two parts of this article: the insurance
crisis and the actual experience of municipalities in court.
A. Tort Claims Acts in General
In many states, the abrogation of sovereign immunity for governmen-
tal negligence came from the judiciary. Whether judicially or legislatively
initiated, most states today have tort claims statutes which remove local
government immunity from suit for certain types of negligence.5' The
typical tort claims act takes one of two forms: the state either waives
immunity for its political subdivisions and carves out the exceptions where
immunity continues; or vice versa, i.e. there is no general waiver of
immunity, but liability attaches for specific acts.55 In either case the
contours of state tort claims acts are quite similar. Local governments are
liable for negligent ministerial acts and not liable for those acts classified as
discretionary. Only a few states still use the governmental/proprietary
distinction to divine when liability attaches.5"
In addition to discretionary acts, legislative action or nonaction,
judicial acts, granting of permits or licenses, arrests and imprisonments are
uniformly clothed with immunity. Most states have specifically limited
54. Over two-thirds of states have tort claims statutes. See Appendix A.
55. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.02 & 466.03 (West 1977) as an example of the
waiver of liability or open-ended model, and CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815-818.8 (West 1980)
as an example of the exception or closed-ended model.
56. Ohio recently enacted a tort claims act which incorporates the prior common law
governmental-proprietary distinction. Its statute contains detailed definitions of what
constitutes governmental and proprietary functions, as well as broad catchall clauses for
each. For example, a governmental function includes any function that is for the common
good of all citizens of the state or that "promotes or preserves the public peace, health,
safety, or welfare; that involves activities that are not engaged in or not customarily engaged
in by nongovernmental persons; and that is not specified in division (G)(2) of this section as
a proprietary function." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2744.01(C)(1)(b) & (c) (Anderson
1987 Supp.).
Michigan, Texas and Rhode Island also incorporate the governmental/proprietary
distinction. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1413 (West 1987); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. §
101.022(b) (Vernon 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 (1985). Michigan defines a
proprietary function as "an activity primarily conducted for the purpose of producing a
pecuniary profit." MICH. Comp. LAws ANN § 691.1413 (West !987). Damage limitations
are not applicable to proprietary activities in Texas and Rhode Island.
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government liability for unimproved property, the conditions of streets and
highways caused by weather conditions57 and government inspections.
Another fairly common provision in state tort claims acts is the designation
of the initial decisions as to the placement of traffic signs and other traffic
controls as discretionary, and therefore immune. 8
As to public buildings and other public property, e.g. streets, high-
ways, and bridges, the state statutes vary as to when local governments can
be held liable for negligent operation and maintenance. In many states the
plaintiff must prove the government had actual or constructive notice of a
"dangerous condition" and reasonable time to repair. 59 Moreover, con-
structive notice and reasonableness tend to be narrowly defined. The
Illinois statute, for example, specifies that there is no constructive notice if
the inspection system used by the government was reasonably adequate.
Determination of the adequacy of the inspection system is based on a cost-
benefit analysis which takes into account the cost of the inspection system
and the likelihood of injury.60 Similarly, the California statute specifies
that reasonableness is determined by taking into consideration the time
and opportunity the public entity had to take action and by "weighing the
probability and gravity of potential injury to persons and property
foreseeably exposed to the risk of injury against the practicability and cost
. . . of protecting against the risk of injury. 6 1
The typical tort claims act, moreover, contains additional protections
for the public fisc not available to private defendants. The most important
are: (i) procedural requirements making it more difficult to sue the
government than a private individual corporation, such as notice require-
57. The "snow and ice" exception can be found in nearly every state, even those
without tort claims acts. See generally 2 C.J. ANTIEU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§
13.05-13.11 (1989).
58. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 3-104 (Smith-Hurd 1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 59:4-5 (West 1982); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 101.060(a)(1) (Vernon 1986).
59. See, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 830-835 (West 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 (West
1982). Both California and New Jersey require that injuries be proximately caused by a
dangerous condition on public property. The condition must have been negligently caused
by an employee, or the government must have had actual or constructive notice and
reasonable time to correct it. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691-1403 & 691-1406
(West 1982) (limiting liability for injuries arising out of defects on streets and public
buildings to those where the government knew or should have known of the defect and had
reasonable time to repair but failed to do so).
60. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85 para. 3-102(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
61. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 835.4.
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ments62 and short statutes of limitations;63 (ii) limitations on damage
recoveries;" and (iii) exclusion of punitive damages and prejudgment
interest.6 5 Thus, at the beginning of the eighties, the vast majority of states
already provided a variety of immunity protections aimed at preserving
governmental processes and purse.
B. Changes in State Tort Claims Acts
Since the early 1980s there has been significant legislative activity to
define more sharply governmental tort liability, and to narrow exposure to
liability. For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures has
called for a general revitalization of "a restricted form of sovereign
immunity. ' '6 6 Of the various legislative reforms, one of the most common
62. Most states require the plaintiff to file a notice of claim with the defendant
government within a short period of time after the claim arose or discovery of the claim. Six
months is commonly used as the time period in which such notice is to be filed. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-109 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 6-906 (Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 613A.5 (West Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-404 (1984);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.05 (West 1977); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 101.101 (Vernon
1986). A few states have 90-day periods, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51 § 156(B) (West
Supp. 1988-89), and a few have periods of one year or longer. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.28(6)(a) (West 1989) (three years in most cases). NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-920 (1987)
(one year); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-13 (1986) (one year); WYO. STAT. § 1-39-113(a)
(1977) (two years).
63. The typical statute of limitations period for commencement of an action is two
years from filing the notice of claim. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-911 (Supp. 1989); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 613A.5; W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(a) (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.275(8)
(1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). In 1980 Illinois shortened
its statute of limitations from two years to one year. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85 para. 8-101
(Smith-Hurd 1987).
In a few states inclusion of the amount claimed for damages is prohibited. E.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 910 (West Supp. 1990) (amended in 1987 to provide that no dollar amount is
to be included if over $10,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.04(B) (Page's supp. 1988)
(prohibits any specification of a dollar amount for damages sought). Louisiana does not
allow jury trials. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5105 (West Supp. 1989).
64. More than half of the states have damage caps. See Appendix B. Three states
allow recovery against a local government of up to the amount of insurance if available.
Otherwise the local government. is immune. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1987); GA.
CODE ANN. § 36-33-1(a) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1403 (1986).
65. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818 (West 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105(c)
(1984); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403(c) (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
13:5106 & 13:5117 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.04; W. VA. CODE § 29-
12A-7(a) (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270(2) (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(3)
(1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(b) (Law Co-op. 1989).
66. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 156 (statement of Hon. Grant Jones on
behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures). A summary of actions pending
before state legislatures, prepared in 1986 by the National Conference of State legislatures,
listed ten states as having bills introduced dealing with sovereign immunity. National
Conference of State Legislatures, Summary of State Legislative Action (1986).
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was what might be called government's "product liability" reform which
mirrors the concern in the private sector about the broad exposure of
manufacturers to product liability claims. A number of states, following
the lead of California,67 Illinois68 and New Jersey,6 9 specifically excepted
from tort liability injuries caused by design defects in public buildings and
infrastructure.7" Also included in this "product liability" exception is
immunity for failure to upgrade, improve, or otherwise alter such public
67. California's statute provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an
injury caused by the plan or design of a construction of, or an improvement to,
public property where such plan or design has been approved in advance of the
construction or improvement by the legislative body of the public entity or by some
other body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or
where such plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards previously so
approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that there is any substantial
evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have
adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative
body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the
standards therefor. [Notwithstanding notice that constructed or improved public
property may no longer be in conformity with a plan or design or a standard which
reasonably could be approved by the legislative body or other body or employee, the
immunity provided by this section shall continue for a reasonable period of time
sufficient to permit the public entity to obtain funds for and carry out remedial work
necessary to allow such public property to be in conformity with a plan or design
approved by the legislative body of the public entity or other body or employee, or
with a plan or design in conformity with a standard previously approved by such
legislative body or other body or employee. In the event that the public entity is
unable to remedy such public property because of practical impossibility or lack of
sufficient funds, the immunity provided by this section shall remain so long as such
public entity shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings of the
existence of the condition not conforming to the approved plan or design or to the
approved standard .... ]
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980) (the part in brackets was added to the statute in
1979).
68. Illinois, like California, exempts design defects if the plan or design was approved
by the appropriate governmental body exercising discretionary authority. A government
can be liable "if after the execution of such plan or design it appears from its use that it has
created a condition that is not reasonably safe." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 3-103
(Smith-Hurd 1987). In another section relating to sidewalks and streets, the statute
provides immunity for failure to upgrade streets, sidewalks, traffic signs, etc. to new
standards. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 3-105 (West 1987).
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6 (West 1982).
70. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.01 (West Supp. 1983) (enacted in
1984 as part of the state's tort claims act for public entities); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-
3(16) (Burns Supp. 1989) (added in 1987 to except design of highways where design or
redesign twenty or more years old); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.4(7) (West Supp. 1989)
(added in 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(m) (Supp. 1989) (enacted in 1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(26) (West Supp. 1990) (amended in 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
78-60(15) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (enacted in 1986 as part of the state's tort claims act);
WYo. STAT. § 1-39-120(a) (1988) (added in 1986).
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facilities. 1 Similarly, a number of states have widened the immunity for
decisions related to the placement of traffic controls.7 2 A few states have
gone farther and exempt from tort liability the ordinary maintenance of
certain types of public property."
Another exception adopted in recent years by a number of states
exempts local governments for the operation and maintenance or inade-
quacy of hospitals and jails.74 Other areas of reform include immunizing
activities related to recreation,7 waste removal, 76 pollution, 7 day care,78
71. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.4(8) (West Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 1-39-
120(a) (1988).
72. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 3-104 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (amended in
1984 to expand both scope of immunity and types of traffic controls covered; immunity is
now absolute, whereas prior law incorporated the need for warnings under certain
circumstances). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1)(d) (Bradford 1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-20-203(a) (Supp. 1989).
73. Wyoming amended its statute in 1986 to provide that there was no liability for
injuries arising out of the maintenance of streets, highways, or bridges. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-
120(a) (1989). Nebraska amended its tort claims statute in 1983 to specifically permit
maintenance of highways at a minimal level. NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-914 (1987). In 1985
Minnesota exempted construction, operation and maintenance of water access sites
(including those sites related to water filled mine pits), parks and open recreational areas
from liability. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(6)(c) & (e) (West Supp. 1989). Similarly,
South Carolina, in enacting a tort claims act in 1986, limited liability for maintenance and
supervision of parks and playgrounds to situations where there was failure to repair "within
a reasonable time after actual notice." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(16) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988) (emphasis supplied). California adopted a series of amendments limiting
liability for unimproved property, road repair of nondedicated roads, land failures and
hazardous recreational activities. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 831.21, 831.25, 831.3, and 831.7
(West Supp. 1989) (enacted in 1987, 1984, 1981, and 1983, respectively). Illinois, in 1984,
expanded its immunity for maintenance of parks, playgrounds and open areas to include all
recreational buildings and enclosed facilities. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 3-106 (Smith-
Hurd 1987).
74. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(11) (West Supp. 1989) (added in 1986 to
exclude liability for treatment at a municipal hospital or prison where "reasonable use of
available funds has been made to provide care"); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(14) (1986) (the
tort claims act enacted in 1986 excludes from liability losses related to the provision,
equipping, lawful operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional facility);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(23) (West Supp. 1989) (amended in 1984 to exclude losses
related to the provision, operation and maintenance of prisons); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 3-21-8 supp. 1989) (enacted in 1986 to exclude liability for failure to provide, or any
inadequacy of, jails); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. STAT. § 2744.01 (C)(2)(h) & (o) (Anderson
Supp. 1988) (excludes from liability the maintenance and the operation of jails and
operation of mental health facilities).
75. For examples of recent legislation relating to recreational activities, see CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 831.7 (West Supp. 1989) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 3409 (Smith-
Hurd 1987) (both of which limit liability for hazardous recreational activities); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 466.03(6)(e) (West Supp. 1989) (added in 1986 to immunize acts related to
the construction, operation and maintenance of parks and open areas).
76. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(l)(l)(iii) (Supp. 1989) (amended in 1985
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and emergency telephone services. 9 One state prohibits use of strict
liability in connection with certain types of pollution cases against
government defendants. 80
Equally important is the expansion of the types of entities and persons
which come under the immunity umbrella. States have, for example,
extended immunity to volunteer boards and commissions appointed by
local governments.81 City managers, city council members and other
individual members of government have been given immunity for their
negligent acts. 2 In a few states athletic groups and events have also been
favored with immunity.8 3
Reviewing these changes as a whole, without taking into account the
considerable across the board tort reform changes such as the abandon-
ment of joint and several liability, 4 one sees legislatures both reacting to
insurance availability problems in specific areas, for example, by granting
to provide immunity for handling hazardous materials); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(16)
(1986) (enacted in 1986 as part of state's tort claims act, it immunizes the operation of
landfills).
77. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:9 (Supp. 1989) (added in 1986 a
requirement that plaintiff show by a preponderance of the evidence that acts of government
with respect to a "pollution incident" were unreasonable, combined with a presumption that
acts were reasonable if in compliance with prevailing standards). See also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-10-106(4) (1988), discussed in infra note 80.
78. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(6)(d) (West Supp. 1989) (added in 1986 to
provide immunity if day care providers, licensed by the municipality, do not meet state
licensing standards unless the municipality had actual or constructive notice of the failure).
79. Two states immunize losses arising out of operation of a "911" emergency system.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. § 101.062 (Vernon Supp. 1989) and IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-"
16.5(17) (Burns Supp. 1989).
80. Colorado prohibits absolute or strict liability in connection with "a dangerous
condition of, or the operation and maintenance of, a public water facility or public
sanitation facility." COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(4) (1988).
81. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-902(2) (Supp. 1989) (amended in 1986 to include state
licensed hospitals and nursing homes in the definition of political subdivisions); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.28(10)(a) (West 1989) (amended in 1988 to treat health care providers of
prisoner health care as agents of the state).
82. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.050 (Supp. 1988) (adopted in 1986 to immunize members
of nonprofit organizations, school boards and members of governing bodies for all but gross
negligence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-201(2) (Supp. 1989) (gives immunity to all
members of governmental boards, commissions and authorities, except for gross negligence
or willful or wanton conduct); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6119 (Supp. 1988) (immunity for
members of governing bodies, commissions, committees or councils).
83. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(20) (West Supp. 1989) (no liability in connection
with government sponsored athletic conferences).
84. For other tort reform legislation related to local governments defendants only
(other than legislation dealing with immunity), see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-3 (West
Supp. 1989) (public entities are severally liable); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:9 (Supp.
1988) (joint and several liability for injuries arising out of pollution incidents and
government defendant's liability greater than 50 %); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-8 (Burns
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immunity for operation of landfills or day care centers or athletic and
recreational activities, and anticipating future liability costs by adopting
changes in the law related to the widespread neglect of public infrastruc-
ture and the consequences of that neglect. For better or worse, the
legislative trend is to react to a crisis in ways that raise precisely the issues
that were discussed in Part II.
IV. INSURANCE CRISIS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
A. Empirical Basis for Concern
Regardless of the causes of the liability insurance industry crisis of the
mid-eighties (still a matter of political and scholarly debate), the evidence
is overwhelming that the effect on local governments as a group was
particularly severe. Premium increases of 200%-400% accompanied by
lower coverage and higher deductibles were the norm.85 Moreover,
widespread policy cancellations and withdrawals of companies from the
municipal liability insurance market often made insurance unavailable at
any cost.86 Dozens of states organized task forces during this period to
investigate the causes of the liability insurance crisis. One task force, the
Cuomo Commission, found that the types of activities singled out by the
insurance industry as uninsurable risks tended to be publicly supplied
services, such as hazardous waste removal, recreation activities, mass
transit and child care centers. 87 The Cuomo Commission's findings were
echoed in the findings of a survey of 145 cities nationwide,88 in the
testimony of various local government organizations before Congressional
hearings and in the accompanying flurry of activity of such organizations
calling for tort and insurance reform.89 Similarly, a 1985 report by the
1986) (Indiana preserves the rule of contributory negligence for government entities,
whereas it has otherwise adopted comparative negligence).
85. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 12, at 9; 1 Cuomo Commission Report,
supra note 12, at 33.
86. Availability and Cost of Liability Insurance, 1986: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1986)
(testimony of Chuck Hardwick, Assemblyman, Speaker of the New Jersey General
Assembly, on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures); 1 Cuomo
Commission Report, supra note 12, at 24.
87. 1 Cuomo Commission Report, supra note 12, at 24, 41.
88. U.S. Conference of Mayors, U.S. Municipal Liability Concerns, A 145 City
Survey (July 1986), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 102-14.
89. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 84 (statement of Lee Ruck, General Counsel,
National Association of Counties); U.S. Conference of Mayors, supra note 88; House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 142-44; Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, supra note 86, at 168 (statement of William D. Gunter, Commis-
sioner, Florida insurance Department); id. at 194-97 (testimony of Jack Floyd, Executive
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National Association of Independent Insurers of the Property/Casualty
Insurance Industry cites municipal liability as one of four main causes of
the "explosive growth of insurance costs" and hence, the reason for
"affordability and availability problems in municipal liability
insurance."90
B. Reaction of States and Local Governments
The reactions of states and their local governments to the insurance
crisis must be placed in the context of the swirl of theories advanced at the
time about its cause or causes. For many, if not most, of the local
governments who found themselves inadequately insured, past liability
records bore little or no relationship to the size of premium increases or to
the withdrawals.91 The lack of correlation between past liability exposure
and insurance costs led some governments and consumer groups to lay the
blame at the feet of the insurance companies. At best, the companies were
mismanaged, under regulated or ineffectively regulated.92 At worst, the
insurance companies were engaged in price-fixing9" or a conspiracy to lasso
support for the industry's tort reform agenda from local governments -
perhaps the most powerful lobbying group at the state level.94
Vice-President, Tennessee Municipal League, Risk Management Pool); id. at 232-34
(testimony of Chuck Hardwick, Assemblyman, Speaker of the New Jersey General
Assembly, on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures).
90. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC. AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPEN-
DENT INSURERS; 1985 A CRITICAL YEAR: A STUDY OF THE PROPERTY/CASUALTY
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 28, 29 (May 1985); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 126
(statement of the Alliance of American Insurers) (citing municipal liability as one of the
major problem areas of liability coverage).
9 1. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion, supra note 86, at 236 (testimony of Chuck Hardwick, Assemblyman, Speaker of the
New Jersey General Assembly, on behalf of the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures); id. at 36 (testimony of Ralph Nader, Director, Center for Study of Responsive Law).
92. Id. at 80 (statement of Jay Angoff, Counsel, National Insurance Consumer
Organization); id. at 168 (statement of William D. Hunter, Commissioner, State of Florida
Insurance Dept.); id. at 174 (testimony of Lawrence H. Thompson, Chief Economist,
United States General Accounting Office). See also House Hearings, supra note I, at 26
(statement of J. Robert Hunter, President, National Insurance Consumer Organization).
93. The McCarram-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from federal
antitrust laws. Reske, Was There a Liability Crisis?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 46 (discussing
lawsuits filed in 19 states alleging conspiracy to limit or exclude certain types of insurance
coverage in order to cut competition and increase prices).
94. The Costs and Availability of Liability Insurance for Small Business 1986:
Hearings before the House Comm. on Small Business, Part 2,99th Cong. 2d Sess. 761,765
(1986) (letter from Michael A. Hatch, Commissioner, State of Minnesota Department of
Commerce); see generally Priest, supra note 4, at 1523-24; Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith
& Simon, Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis: Sources of the Crisis in Liability
Insurance, An Economic Perspective, 5 YALE J. REG. 367, 377-94 (1988).
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In response, the insurance industry attacked the existing tort system,
arguing that unpredictability of future costs due to expansive changes in
liability exposure, not past liability records, was the root cause of the
insurance crisis. 95 The industry pointed to municipalities' increased and ill-
defined exposure to liability under section 1983, and the willingness of
courts to impose strict liability for pollution and hazardous waste
activities ."
In an immediate reaction to the crisis, states and local governments
moved to self-insurance, various pooling arrangements and risk manage-
ment programs.97 Nearly half of the states set up task forces in 1986.8 A
1986 study of current legislative activity in the area of insurance reform
found eleven states had bills introduced to place tighter regulatory controls
on rate fixing, mid-term cancellations, and coverage reductions by the
insurance companies.99 Similarly, there has been pressure to end the
insurance industry's exemption from the antitrust laws or at least to
increase federal regulation to counter ineffective state regulation."' And
of course, as discussed in Part III, there has been the adoption of legislation
to immunize certain high-risk government activities. Governments, to that
extent, have acted consistently with the insurance industry's understand-
ing of the crisis.
The debate over the cause or causes of the insurance crisis has received
serious scholarly attention.10 ' It is not within the scope of this article to
review or reexamine this debate. It should be emphasized, however, that
analyzing the causes of the crisis for local governments is important in
95. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 139, 142-43 (statement of the
American Insurance Association).
96. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC. AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPEN-
DENT INSURERS, supra note 90, at 28.
97. THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK: 1987, 55 (noting that 12 states established pooling
mechanisms, at least 20 enacted provisions for self insurance and 7 states established risk
management programs); see also The Municipal Attorney, 1986 Mid Year Seminar 4-8
(Mar.-Apr. 1986) (reporting on workshops held concerning pooling, self insurance and risk
management).
98. THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK: 1987, 55.
99. National State Legislative Conference, Selected State Legislative Action Re:
Affordability and Availability of Liability Insurance (Aug. 4, 1986).
100. See, e.g., Current State of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 1987: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong., I st Sess. 238-41 (1987); The Liability
Insurance Crisis, 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of
the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 285-87
(1986); N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1987, at 26, col. 1 (editorial).
101. See Priest, supra note 4; Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, supra note
94; Abraham, The Causes of the Insurance Crisis, 37 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 54 (1988).
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order to judge the appropriateness of the way in which the insurance
industry and, in turn, the state legislatures have responded. Theories of
insurance mismanagement, in particular the collusion theories, do not
adequately explain why insurance companies have refused to sell their
product to willing buyers. 1' Insurance unavailability, when combined
with evidence of increased tort costs incurred by self-insured local
governments, 10 3 suggests that it is appropriate to focus attention on the
interaction of today's tort system with third-party insurance coverage. If
the increase in insurance premiums and the unavailability of insurance are
not attributable to increases in municipal liability,' 0 ' changes in how
certain activities are insured may be more appropriate than a return to
wider immunity."'
Insurance has become a major burden for municipalities, regardless
of the source of the problem. The point, however, is that the problem may
not be the one defined by the insurance industry. As will be seen, the data
suggest the need to rethink both the crisis and the "reforms" designed to
resolve it.
102. Priest, supra note 4, at 1527-29; Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon,
supra note 94 at 383.
103. See text accompanying infra note 156 (self-insured New York City's increased
tort costs).
104. A recent study of the insurance industry, undertaken to find empirical evidence
of an insurance crisis, supports the position that the crisis was not fueled by an "explosion"
of tort litigation. Nye & Gifford, The Myth of the Liability Insurance Claims Explosion:
An Empirical Rebuttal, 41 VAND. L. REV. 909, 918-20 (1988). Another study, however,
did find a strong relationship between the current direction of tort law in certain lines of
liability insurance and the insurance crisis. Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon,
supra note 94, at 389-94. This study did not look at frequency of claims, but examined
income to premium ratios and underwriting gain/loss ratios for the property-casualty
insurance industry. It found larger payments and more volatility, resulting in greater
deterioration of operating ratios in the crisis lines (other liability and medical malpractice)
than in the industry generally. Id. at 390-91.
See infra notes 106-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of empirical evidence of
a tort explosion.
105. Both Priest, supra note 4, and Abraham, supra note 101, clearly link changes in
the tort liability system to the insurance crisis, although neither is sanguine about the
reforms generally proposed to cure the problems. Neither feels the reforms deal with the
inherent problems in the structure of a third party liability insurance regime with expanded
tort liability. Priest, supra note 4, at 1588-90; Abraham, supra note 101, at 63. Priest,
moreover, suggests that municipalities which can shift to insurance pools and self-insurance
are in a much better position than their corporate counterparts because such shifts move the
insurance system from a third party liability insurance system to a first party system. This,
Priest argues, should be the direction of the change. Priest, supra note 4, at 1581-82.
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V. AVAILABLE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Immunity from suit is the one area of tort reform which is unique to
government defendants. As the discussion in Part III indicates, there has
been a significant amount of legislative activity broadening the scope of
governmental immunity. These changes were enacted in response to claims
of the increased liability costs which hamper the provision of public
services. Even if one recognizes the need to protect the legislative process of
resource allocation and accepts as a consequence the inherent inequities in
cost distribution, what evidence is there to support the claims of local
governments that they are paying too much? Much of the evidence is
anecdotal. There is no dearth of horror stories about budget-busting
judgments resulting in the elimination of needed public services,10 6 the
threat of bankruptcy, 10 7 and the difficulty in retaining public servants who
fear potential liability.108 We do know that insurance premiums increased
dramatically and that many local governments have been unable to get
insurance for certain types of activities.1 09
To approach the question systematically, we need information about
changes over time (adjusted where necessary for inflation or population
growth) in (i) the aggregate amount of payments made by government for
claims against it; (ii) the number of claims made; (iii) the number which
result in payment (whether by settlement or final judgment); (iv) the mean
size of awards; (v) the distribution of awards by size; and (vi) the amounts
paid in final judgments versus the amount paid in settlements. In order to
better understand the deep pocket phenomenon, we also need to make
comparisons between governmental and other large defendants in terms of
their success in litigation. We also need information as to changes over time
in the portion of total awards in multiple defendant suits which are borne
by local governments.
The following discussion surveys the available empirical data. It
considers three major sources of information: data from the Rand Institute
for Civil Justice on civil jury verdicts; tort filing data from various sources;
and data on New York City tort filings and settlements. At the outset, it
should be noted that there is very little empirical evidence dealing
specifically with local governments as defendants. Studies of personal
106. See, e.g., U.S. Conference of Mayors, supra note 88, at 110.
107. Ranii, Cities Drawing Legal Fire, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1983, at 1, 20.
108. U.S. Conference of Mayors, supra note 88, at 109 (while claiming that
resignations were perhaps the most dramatic illustrations of the dire municipal liability
crisis, the survey noted only two of the 145 cities reported any resignations in responses to
concern over personal liability).
109. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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injury litigation have either excluded government defendants from their
samples or do not isolate types of defendants."' 0 The Rand Institute for
Civil Justice data, discussed below, are the only data available which
differentiate among types of defendants, and then only with respect to the
1959-1979 Cook County study of jury trials.
A. Rand Institute for Civil Justice Data
The richest sources of data on tort litigation are the Rand Institute for
Civil Justice studies of jury verdicts in civil cases in Cook County, Illinois
and in San Francisco, California."'
The data from the first Cook County study are the most specific and
will be discussed more fully below. Of the 19,000 civil cases tried before
Cook County juries between 1959 and 1979, 98% were tort cases. 1 2
Municipalities and government agencies constituted 8 % of the defend-
ants, 25 % were corporations and 1 % were hospital and other nonprofit
organizations. Data from the San Francisco study and the subsequent
studies do not distinguish the types of defendants. The following summa-
rizes some of the salient information provided by the Rand data and
analyzes what it communicates about local governments and the tort crisis.
1. Increases in Dollar Amounts of Verdicts
Neither the Cook County nor the San Francisco data for the twenty
year period showed significant increases in the median size of plaintiffs'
judgments' 13 or in plaintiffs' overall rate of success." 4 On the other hand,
110. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
11I. See generally M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY, TRENDS IN TRIALS
AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (1982) [hereinafter COOK COUNTY
STUDY]; M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN
SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES (1983) [hereinafter SAN FRANCISCO STUDY]; DEEP
POCKETS STUDY, supra note 13; M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980's, TRENDS IN
JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1987)
[hereinafter 1984 UPDATE]; D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON,
TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION, THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS (1987).
112. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 6. Cases were grouped as follows (the
first number is the percentage of cases in Cook County, the second the percentage of cases in
San Francisco): automobile accidents (66 %) (48 %); worker injury (5 %) (15 %); injury on
property (9%) (13%); common carrier (6%) (8%); product liability (4%) (7%);
professional malpractice (2%) (7%); contracts/business (2%) (6%); intentional tort
(4%) (6%); street hazard (3%) (3%); dram shop (3%) (0%); and miscellaneous (2%)
(5 %). Id.; SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 111, at 9.
113. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 22-23; SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra
note 11l, at xii. This median is "the verdict that is equal to or greater than the smallest 50
percent of judgments for the year." COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 11, at 21 n.17.
114. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 17-18 (noting that although the
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the average size of judgments showed a dramatic increase because of an
increase in awards in the very large cases. During 1978 and 1979 in Cook
County, after adjusting for inflation, "the largest 10 percent of judgments
had values . . . almost three times greater than the largest 10 percent of
judgments during the 1960s." 5 The "high-stakes" cases, malpractice,
product liability, worker injury, and contracts and business had the largest
awards. 16 In the four high-stakes cases plus street hazard cases both
average and median awards increased in all ranges of awards." 7 The
overall median stayed constant because of the constancy of awards found in
the other five categories of cases, which accounted for more than 80 % of
the plaintiffs' judgments." 8
The updated figures from the eighties show that average awards have
increased across the board. Large increases continued to be observed in the
high-stakes cases," 9 but, unlike the earlier period, the very large awards
were not limited to these categories.' 20 Plaintiffs' success rate also rose in
both jurisdictions, continuing the trends observed the last half of the
seventies. 2 '
2. Number of Cases Tried
The number of jury trials changed in the twenty year period of the
studies, but the changes do not correspond with the wide perception of a
litigation explosion in the 1970s. Jury trials increased in the mid-sixties,
percentage of plaintiffs' victories at jury trial remained a constant during the period, this
general trend masked individual trends within the categories of cases). Plaintiffs' overall
rate of victory in San Francisco was 57 %. Again, the overall trend does not reflect changes
within the categories. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 111, at 23-24.
115. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 22.
116. Id. at 24.
117. Id. at 27. See text accompanying infra notes 132-38 for a discussion of street
hazard cases and the importance of this category to changes in government liability.
118. Id. at 28.
119. 1984 UPDATE, supra note I 11, at 20-23. Among the low-stakes cases, significant
increases in both the average and median awards occurred in "injury on property" cases.
See infra note 137 for a discussion of this change.
120. 1984 UPDATE, supra note 111, at 25.
121. Success rates in Cook County increased from 49% to 64%, and the rate of
success in San Francisco rose from 57 % to 61 %. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at
17; SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 111, at 11; 1984 UPDATE, supra note 111, at 50.
Plaintiffs in Cook County were more successful in every category. Some of this increase is
attributable to the switch in 1981 to comparative negligence. Not all of the increase was
considered the result of the change in law, since increases in plaintiffs' success rates
occurred in types of cases where plaintiffs' negligence is not likely an issue. Id. at 16.
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peaking in 1968, and thereafter decreased until 1978.122 In the eighties the
trend toward fewer trials continued in San Francisco, but was reversed in
Cook County, which experienced increases in trials in nearly all categories
of suits.123 The authors of the Rand study suggest that this phenomenon
could, in part, be explained by Illinois' 1981 adoption of comparative
negligence.12' They attribute the decrease in San Francisco either to more
settlements or to changes in judicial administration. 2 5
3. Mix of Cases
While auto accident cases dominated the caseloads throughout the
period, they showed steady decline from 1970 onward, as high-stakes suits
increased in number. 26 Of particular interest are the trends in the
categories of lawsuits with high government defendant representation:
street hazard (involving negligent design or maintenance of roads or
sidewalks or obstructions on roads or sidewalks), common carrier (involv-
ing liability to injured passengers on buses, trains, cabs, and airplanes), and
injury on property (property owner's liability to tenants, guests, and
trespassers). 27 In Cook county during the period 1959-1979,128 injury on
property cases were the second most numerous type of lawsuit, common
carrier, the third; while street hazard cases constituted only 3 % of total
cases. 129 The number of cases tried in all three of these "government"
categories declined during this period. Plaintiffs in both jurisdictions won
fewer injury on property cases than the average and received modest
122. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 11; SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra
note 111, at 19-20.
123. 1984 UPDATE, supra note 111, at 7-8.
124. Id.
125. During the period, California raised the jurisdictional requirements of its lower
court and instituted a "court annexed" program of arbitration. Both changes may have
contributed to the smaller number of trials. Id. at 8-9.
126. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 111 at 66.
127. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 6 n.3. As mentioned supra, published
data only identify the types of defendants for the original Cook County Study. The
percentages of government defendants for the three categories - street hazards, common
carrier and injury on property - were 41%, 43 % and 8 %, respectively. DEEP POCKETS
STUDY, supra note 13, at 15.
128. Property and street hazard jury trials declined 40% over the period, while
common carrier cases declined 60%. CooK COUNTY STUDY, supra note I 11, at 15.
129. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note I ll, at 1. Automobile accident cases were the
most numerous, constituting 66% of the Cook County cases. Id. at 7. Governments were
defendants in 5 % of the Cook County automobile accident cases. DEEP POCKETS STUDY,
supra note 13, at 15. In San Francisco, automobile accidents constituted 48 % of the cases,
followed by worker injury with 15 %, injury on property at 13 % and common carrier at 8 %.
Street hazard cases were 3 %. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 11, at 7.
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awards.'3 0 In common carrier cases, plaintiffs won more frequently than
average, but awards were small.'
Street hazard cases concern the operation and maintenance of streets
and sidewalks. As discussed in Part II above, the extent of government
liability for negligent operation and maintenance of public infrastructure
has been a focal point of recent legislative activity.'32 Hence, data on trends
in these cases is especially instructive. Both Cook County and San
Francisco had few street hazard cases during the periods studied. 33 But,
although the Cook County data for 1959-1979 showed a decrease in the
number of street hazard trials, the average size of plaintiffs' awards
increased dramatically - 830% from 1960-1967 to 1975-1979).134 This
same phenomenon was not observed in San Francisco.35
The more recent data (1980-1984) revealed some changes in two of
the government defendant categories: injury on property and street hazard
cases. In both jurisdictions there was a three fold increase in average
awards in injury of property cases and an increase in median awards. The
number ofjury trials for injury on property cases in Cook County increased
60 %, and the number of trials did not decrease as did the number for all
other personal injury cases in San Francisco.1"' The size of awards in street
hazard cases in Cook County decreased, 137 reversing the trend of the
earlier Cook County study. The number of street hazard cases tried,
however, increased 150% from the late 1970's.138
4. Defendants
How are government defendants affected by these general trends?
Government defendants predominated in only two of the ten Rand
categories of suits - common carrier and street hazard cases. Neither of
130. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 54; SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra
note 111, at 71.
131. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 11l, at 52; SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra
note I 1l, at 14. These studies do not correlate size of awards with severity of injury.
132. See text accompanying supra notes 67-73.
133. There were only 148 trials in the twenty year period in San Francisco. SAN
FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 11l, at 73.
134. COOK COUNTY STUDY, supra note 111, at 36.
135. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note I 11, at 74. A comparison of data shows that
awards in Cook County for street hazard cases at the beginning of the period were much
lower than those awarded in San Francisco.
136. 1984 UPDATE, supra note 111, at 23.
137. The median award fell 80%. Id. at 25.
138. Id. at 25. There were too few street hazard cases in San Francisco to calculate
mean and median awards (twenty in the period 1975-1979 and twelve in the period 1980-
1984). Id. at 11.
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these categories is considered a high-stakes category. In all other catego-
ries the percentages ranged from 0.5 %, in dram shop cases, to 8 %, in
injury on property cases."3 9 In the original Cook County study, government
agencies were usually sole defendants.'"
The Rand data supports the proposition, discussed in Part II, that
government defendants are more successful than other defendants."" For
example, they were more successful than individual defendants in ob-
taining directed verdicts." 2 The authors suggest that this may be evidence
of a tendency to join government defendants as incidental defendants. In
street hazard cases, plaintiffs won 52% of trials, yet defendants lost only
40% .43 The difference between plaintiffs' wins and defendants' losses is
caused by multiple defendants, multiple issues or a combination. Again,
this disparity in a category with high government defendant representation
may be evidence of plaintiffs' practice of joining government defendants
even where the case against the government is weak. Since we do not have
updated data on individual categories of defendants, we do not know if
plaintiffs' success rate against government defendants has changed since
1979 or if, as a result of the shift to comparative negligence, government
defendants are joined more often than before.
5. Deep Pocket Phenomenon
The Rand data from Cook County gives some evidence that business
and government are considered deep pockets. As discussed above, both
paid larger awards than individuals for comparable injuries.' 4 ' Moreover,
plaintiffs' awards increased by one-half by adding a corporate or govern-
mental defendant to an individual defendant.", 5
The Deep Pocket Study's conclusion about an overall deep pocket
phenomenon raises some curious questions. Despite the dramatic finding of
a deep pocket effect on government defendants, none of the three
categories in which government defendants predominated showed the very
large disparities in the size of awards that were observed in worker injury,
product liability and malpractice cases - three of the four high stakes
139. DEEP POCKETS STUDY, supra note 13, at 15.
140. Government agencies were sole defendants in 63 % of the trials in the original
Cook County Study. Id. at 17.
141. Governments had favorable jury verdicts in 59% of the cases. Id. at 25.
142. Id. at 24. Similarly, corporate and nonprofit organizations were also more likely
to obtain directed verdicts in their favor.
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. at 41-44.
145. Id. at 48.
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cases.1 46 This suggests that the theory that government defendants pay
significantly more than individual defendants must be based primarily on
awards against government defendants in the high-stakes categories.
Because government defendants made up only 2% of the worker injury
cases, 2 % of product liability cases and 1 % of the professional malpractice
cases, 147 one should be hesitant in making generalizations about an across
the board deep pocket phenomenon. 48
B. Tort Filings Data
Data compiled by the National Center for State Courts on state court
filings for the period 1978-1984 do not overwhelmingly support the
litigation explosion theory.' 49 Like the Rand study, which showed an
upswing in the number of jury trials beginning in 1978, the Center's figures
show a significant increase in filings in the period in 1978-1981 5o Filings
from 1981-1984 decreased. "' The number of tort cases (with data from 21
courts in 17 states), however, increased in both periods: 2% and 7 %,
respectively. 5 The population increases for each period was 4 % and 4 %,
respectively.' 53
Other studies show a higher growth rate for tort filings - approxi-
mately 4% per annum from 1976 to 1986.15 Even when adjusted for
146. See Figure 4.2 in the DEEP POCKETS STUDY, supra note 13, at 53, which shows
gross disparities in awards among categories, using the median award in injury on property
cases as the norm, and then adjusts for nature of the injury and nature of the parties.
147. Id. at 15.
148. A subsequent study using Rand data estimated that governments pay 50% more
than individuals. This number was derived by averaging of all plaintiffs' injuries, because
there were too few cases of permanently and severely injured plaintiffs suing government
defendants. Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 751, 754 (1985). Without additional information as to the types of cases and how
representative these cases are of tort cases against government defendants generally, we
still are not in a position to adequately evaluate the extent or effects of the deep pocket
phenomenon.
149. National Center for State Courts, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1984, 173 [hereinafter 1984 ANNUAL REPORT].
150. Id.
151. Id. See also Roper, The Propensity to Litigate in State Trial Courts, 1981-1984,
1984-1985, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 262, 277-81 (1986) (updating the statistics of the 1984
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 149, and finding that in 1984-85 the downward trend in filings
reported in the 1984 Annual Report had abated, and that there were wide differences
among states as to filing rates).
152. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 182.
153. Id.
154. See D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, supra note 111, at 6
(discussing various estimates of tort litigation increases). The Rand Institute for Civil
Justice's own estimate is 3.9%. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 182.
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increased population, the result is a near doubling of filings. While these
figures, like the Rand and National Center for State Courts studies, do not
support a theory of a sudden explosion of tort litigation in the eighties, they
do show a steady growth over time. The public just may not have been
conscious of the increase until the 1980s. Rand data on California tort
filings, as opposed to data on verdicts, for the period 1974-1985 support the
other Rand data on jury verdicts. There are two distinct trends in tort
filings: one for low-stakes cases and one for high-stakes cases. The former
have remained stable, but the latter have increased at a greater rate than
the rate of increase in population. 155 To the extent that government
defendants are more numerous in the low-stakes cases, filings against them
should have also remained relatively stable.
C. New York City Data
New York City has actively campaigned for tort reform, including the
imposition of damage caps. Data from New York City points to a five fold
increase in tort expenses in the period 1979-1985.156 After adjusting for
inflation, this still represents a dramatic three-fold increase. Since New
York City self-insures, these costs are not attributable to the insurance
market. The statistics for tort claims filed against the City for that period
show a peak of 24,496 in 1978,157 declining to a low of 15,012 in 1981158 and
climbing again to 20,379 in 1985.'19 The ratio of the number of filings to
the number of payments made either by settlement or final judgment has
remained steady throughout the period, suggesting that the increase in tort
expenses was not the result of a sudden shortening in the three-year
average time between filing and payment. Approximately 45 % of the cases
filed between 1977 and 1985 were settled or had a final judgment for the
plaintiff.160
The claims divide more or less evenly between personal injury and
property damage cases.' In terms of average costs, personal injury cases
155. D. HENSLER, M. VATANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, supra note 111 at 7.
156. Koch, supra note 11, at 2.
157. Id. at Exhibit I (table entitled Tort Incident Volume, Fiscal 1976-Fiscal 1990)
(years 1986-1990 are projected numbers).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Exhibit 1 (chart entitled Historical Trends in File Volume and Settlement
Volume, Fiscal 1977-Fiscal 1985).
161. Id. at Exhibit I (table entitled Tort Incident Volume, Fiscal 1976-Fiscal 1990).
Property damage claims are divided into two categories, those which relate to auto
accidents and those that do not. For most years the "other" category has been somewhat
greater. The City projects that auto accidents claims will rise in proportion to other property
1990]
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:375
are far more significant than property damage claims. In 1985, the average
personal injury cost was $31,740 versus $982 for a property damage
claim.'62 Personal injury claims arising out of defective sidewalks and
roadways are the most numerous.' 3
A preliminary review of the New York City statistics substantiates
local governments' claims as to substantial increases in costs, but not
claims as to substantial increases in numbers of suits filed and settled. The
three areas of significantly increased filings in New York were tort suits
related to public buildings and property, schools and police action. The first
two categories go to the issue of operation and maintenance of public
property. These findings are consistent with the Rand data, which also
showed an increase in injury on property trials."6
Looking specifically at the City's figures for the different categories of
personal injury suits, a number of categories of showed substantial
increases in costs. For example, the inflation-adjusted average costs for the
combined first two years, 1977 and 1978, compared with the combined last
two, 1984 and 1985165 reveals that the average costs for defective roadway
suits nearly tripled while the number of filings declined slightly. 6
Similarly, average costs increased 150 % for defective sidewalks while the
number of filings declined.'6 7 Average costs for recreation suits in 1984 and
damage claims. Id. The City has noted that personal injuries arising out of auto accidents
have increased, "and many of the crashes were caused by the large number of rookie police
officers hired in recent years." Goldin Warns of Rising Cost To City for Damage Claims,
N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1986, at 1, col. 3. Perhaps, rookie policemen are the reason for the
projected increase in property damage suits involving auto accidents as well.
162. Koch, supra note 11, at Exhibit 1 (table entitled Average Cost Summary Fiscal
1976-Fiscal 1985).
163. Defective sidewalks claims from 1976-1985 ranged from a high of 3,418 in 1977
to an exceptional low of 1,577 in 1981. Generally, claims were around 3,000 a year.
Defective roadway claims for this period ranged from a low of 788 in 1981 to a high of 1,474
in 1979. In general, the number hovered around 1,000. Koch, supra note 11, at Exhibit 1
(table entitled Tort Incident Volume Fiscal 1976-Fiscal 1990).
164. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
165. 1977 and 1978 monetary values have been multiplied by 1.8 to give effect to the
inflation for the period.
166. Combined defective roadway filings for 1977 and 1978 were 1,039; combined
filings for 1984 and 1985 were 677. The average cost in the earlier period was $10,220, and
the average cost in the last two years was $29,690. Koch, supra note 11, at Exhibit 1 (table
entitled Fiscal 1977-Fiscal 1986, Settlement Volume/Tort Expense Summary).
167. The number of suits in 1977 and 1978 was 3,170; in 1984 and 1985 there were
1,939 filings. Average costs, however, were $6,814 for 1977 and 1978, and $17,431 for 1984
and 1985. Id.
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1985 were seven times as large as in 1977 and 1987, the largest increase of
any category, while the number of filings almost doubled.' 68
Another category which is of particular interest is suits for personal
injury on public property. In 1977 and 1978 there was a total of 23 suits; in
1984 and 1985 there was a total of 248.169 This represents, in effect, a new
category of tort suit and lends support for state and local governments
concern for this growing area of litigation. Personal injury suits involving
schools and those involving police showed stable costs, but almost tripled in
volume. 170
The Cuomo Commission reports that New York City's payments for
personal injury claims increased 372% in the period 1977-1984.'17
Removing malpractice claims, the increase was 306% .171 Medical mal-
practice suits, then, are not the sole cause of the City's increased payments.
In the 1977-1985 period, growth in medical malpractice payments
accounted for only 27 % of the total increase in personal injury claim
payments. 73
Tort claim payments have gone from approximately two-tenths of one
percent to one-half of one percent of total City revenues.1' Thus, these
increases do not support a claim of the threat of imminent curtailment of
public services. Without further analysis of the source of these increases,
the role of the deep pocket syndrome, changes in the distribution of
payments and the comparable experiences of private sector defendants, it
is not possible to tell whether the costs, regardless of their significance as a
portion of the total New York City budget, represent more than the City's
fair share. It is also necessary to analyze how representative New York
City is of other local governments. For example, it may be necessary to
remove medical malpractice data from the evidence since New York's
extensive system of municipal hospitals is unusual among city govern-
ments. It would also be helpful to ascertain whether changes in the
168. The number of suits in 1977 and 78 was 89; in 1984 and 85 the number was 164.
Average costs for the two periods were $4,044 and $27,439, respectively. Id.
169. Id.
170. Filings involving schools went from 539 to 1,327; filings involving police action
went from 228 to 602. Id.
171. Cuomo Commission Report, supra note 12, at 37 n.1.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. In both 1977 and 1978 total city revenues were approximately $14.3 billion. Tort
expenses in those years at $25.5 and $23.3 million, respectively. Revenues for 1984 and
1985 were $20.7 and $23 billion, respectively, and tort expenses were $84 and $118 million.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances 1977, 1978, 1984 and 1985; City
Statement, supra note 21, at Exhibit I (table entitled Fiscal 1977-Fiscal 1986 Settlement
Volume/Tort Expense Summary).
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underlying quality of city services, for example the condition of city
property, including schools, might explain areas of particular growth in
tort liability costs.
D. Open Questions
The Rand and New York City data raise a number of questions about
local government tort liability. The Rand data, unlike the New York City
data, give a distribution of payments which suggests that the increases in
average awards was caused by a significant increase in the top percentiles
as well as increases in awards across all ranges for certain types of high-
stakes cases. The distribution information does not isolate types of
defendants, although we know that government defendants were not
significantly represented in the high-stakes cases in the period 1959-1979.
The New York City data provides no clues as to the distribution of
payments.
We have little data on changes in settlement behavior. The most
recent Rand study of jury verdicts in the 1970's shows a decrease in the
number of jury trials and an increase in the number of filings in both
jurisdictions, which suggests more out of court settlements. This trend
continued in the eighties in San Francisco, but in Cook County, trials
increased. 175 The authors of the Rand studies suggest that the increase in
Cook County reflects, in part, the shift to comparative negligence in 1981.
At the same time changes in jurisdictional requirements affected the
number of trials heard in the San Francisco Superior Court. 76
For New York City, more information is needed on the interaction of
the doctrines of joint and several liability and comparative negligence, and
the influence of this interaction on the City's liability. The Rand data
suggest that governments were most often sole defendants. Evidence of any
changes in the frequency of New York City as a joint defendant would have
relevance to claims of increased deep pocket verdicts against local
governments arising out of the operation of these two tort doctrines. New
York, however, has used the comparative negligence standard since 1975.
Thus, the entire period covered by the New York City data was under the
same standard. It is possible that the effects of combining the two doctrines
took a period of years to appear in the cost statistics because of the time it
174. 1984 UPDATE, supra note 11, at 7.
176. Id.
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takes for a new doctrine to affect the thinking of lawyers and judges and the
lag between filing and payment through settlement or judgment.,
Unlike New York, both California and Illinois changed to compara-
tive negligence during the periods studied: California adopted comparative
negligence in 1975, Illinois in 1981. The Rand data show increases in
plaintiffs' success rate following the change to comparative negligence in
cases likely to have plaintiff's fault at issue: automobile, common carrier
and injury on property cases. 17 8 But overall, the Rand studies did not
consider the shift to comparative negligence the principal cause of
increases in plaintiffs' success rates. In both jurisdictions, trends in success
rates were identifiable years before the change in law.' 79
VI. CONCLUSION
So far, the data on tort filings do not support the existence of a "tort
explosion." On the other hand, the Rand data show distinct trends in both
filings and verdicts in certain types of tort cases, with high-stakes cases
showing continued increases in both number and awards. The New York
City data also lend support to claims of increased tort costs. Moreover,
increased insurance costs and problems of insurance availability were not
imagined. Together, these findings suggest that we many need to rethink
our tort rules and how we insure certain risks.
Clearly, local governments play a role in the response to problems
besetting the tort law system generally. The movement in the past thirty
years away from broad tort immunity for state and local governments for
their negligent acts corresponds with the direction of modern tort law, with
its emphasis on the goals of internalization of accident costs, risk-spreading
and compensation for the victim. Are the effects of the tort crisis so
deleterious for local governments that they require governments to move
away from the direction of modern tort law and toward the revitalization of
tort immunity?
There is little empirical evidence. Questions about changes over time
in filings, rates of success of plaintiffs, distribution of awards and
settlement behavior and their relationship to government defendants
remain largely unanswered. The evidence we do have suggests that the
increasing number of tort suits involving injury on property and street
hazards is a major problem for local governments. This raises two
177. In 1987, New York limited the joint and several liability rule for all defendants as
it applies to noneconomic damages.
178. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY, supra note 111, at 43.
179. 1984 UPDATE, supra note I 1, at 31.
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questions. First, we should ask why suits in these areas are increasing. It
seems clear that increase is the result of decades of neglect of public
facilities and infrastructure. People are being hurt on negligently main-
tained public property. Second, we should ask if reviving tort immunity is
the best solution. It seems clear that tort immunity is not likely to get at the
underlying problem. It allows government decisionmakers to continue
their current practice of neglect. It promotes neither efficiency nor fairness
in governmental decisionmaking. Thus, tort immunity sacrifices all of the
goals of tort law, without the promise of delivering improved public
services.
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
APPENDIX A
STATES WITH TORT CLAIMS ACT
Alaska - ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070 (1983)
Arizona - ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-820 to -826 (Supp. 1989)
California - CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 800 to 867 (West 1980 & Supp 1990)
Colorado - COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 to 120 (1988 & Supp. 1989)
Delaware - DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4010-4013 (Supp. 1988)
Florida - FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.14 (West 1939)
Idaho - IDAHO CODE §§ 6-901 to 929 (1979 & Supp. 1989)
Illinois - ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 1-101 to 9-107 (Smith-Hurd 1987
& Supp. 1989)
Indiana - IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to 34-4-16.5-22 (Burns 1986 &
Supp. 1989)
Iowa - IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 613A.1 to .13 (West Supp. 1989)
Kansas - KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101 to -6119 (1984 & Supp. 1988)
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5 101 to :5111 (West 1968 & Supp.
1989)
Maine - ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8101-8116 (1980 & Supp. 1989)
Maryland - MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-401 to -404 (1989)
Massachusetts - MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, §§ 1-13 (1988 & Supp.
1989)
Michigan - MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1401 to .1415 (West 1987)
Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN. §§466.01 to .15 (West 1977 & Supp.
1990)
Mississippi - MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to -21 (Supp. 1989)
Missouri - Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.600 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990)
Nebraska - NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-901 to 926 (1987)
Nevada - NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.0305 to .039 (1985)
New Jersey - N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 12-3 (West 1982 & Supp.
1989)
New Mexico - N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -29 (1989)
North Dakota - N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-01 to .1-15 (Supp. 1989)
Ohio - OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2744.01.09 (Anderson Supp. 1988)
Oklahoma - OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 151-172 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989)
Oregon - OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260 to .300 (1988)
Pennsylvania - 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8554 (Purdon 1982)
South Carolina - S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989)
South Dakota - S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 3-21-1 to -I (Supp. 1989)
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Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-20-101 to-407 (1980 & Supp. 1989)
Texas - TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-109 (Vernon
1986 & Supp. 1990)
Utah - UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1986, Supp. 1988 & Supp.
1989)
West Virginia - W. VA. CODE §§ 29-12A-1 to -17 (1986)
Wyoming - WYO. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 to -120 (1988)
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APPENDIX B
STATES WITH DAMAGES LIMITATIONS FOR LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Alabama - ALA. CODE § 11-93-2 (1985)
Colorado - COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114 (1988)
Delaware - DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4013 (Supp. 1988)
Florida - FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.14, .28 (West 1989)
Idaho - IDAHO CODE § 6-926 (Supp. 1989)
Indiana - IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986)
Kansas - KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105 (1984 & Supp. 1988)
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.5106 (West Supp. 1989)
Maine - ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 8105 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989)
Maryland - MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403 (Supp. 1989)
Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.04 (West Supp. 1989)
Mississippi - MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 1989)
Missouri - Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.610 (Vernon 1988)
Nevada - NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.035 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989)
New Hampshire - N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (Supp. 1988)
New Mexico - N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (1989)
North Dakota - N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03 (Supp. 1989)
Ohio - OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.05 (Anderson Supp. 1988)
Oklahoma - OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154 (West 1988)
Oregon - OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (1988)
Pennsylvania - PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 42.8553 (Purdon Supp. 1989)
Rhode Island - R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-2 to -3 (1985)
South Carolina - S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)
Tennessee - TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-20-311, -403 (1980 & Supp. 1989)
Texas - TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.023 (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1989)
Utah - UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-22, -34 (1986 & Supp. 1988)
West Virginia* - W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6 (1986)
Wisconsin - WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.82 (West. Supp. 1989)
Wyoming - Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-118 (1988)
*West Virginia has limitations only on noneconomic damages awarded
against local governments.
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